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Acquiring Property Rights ex turpi causa 
Michael W. Poulsom LLB LLM Solicitor (non-practising), Senior Lecturer, 
Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
Ex turpi causa, illegality, prescription, adverse possession, Law Commisssion, 
reform 
 
The Court of Appeal decision in Stoffel & Co v Grondona1 highlights the continuing 
uncertainty surrounding the effect of illegality on enforcement of otherwise available 
rights.  The appellant law firm, having negligently failed to register a Land Registry 
transfer, sought unsuccessfully to defend the resulting claim arguing that the transfer 
had, without their knowledge, been made to facilitate a mortgage fraud. The Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent’s illegal conduct was ‘not 
central, or indeed relevant to the otherwise proper…retainer [but]…simply part of the 
background story’ 2.  The appellant had evidently felt that appealing a straightforward 
professional negligence finding by reference to the claimant’s dishonest, but 
unconnected, conduct had a realistic chance of success.  That the court so clearly 
disagreed perhaps indicates that the operation of illegality is readily misinterpreted. 
The notion that courts will deny wrongdoers a benefit from their wrongful conduct, by 
preventing them enforcing normal private law rights, is prominent and conceptually 
attractive:  Courts have prevented a highwayman from recovering their criminal 
                                                          
1 Stoffel & Co v Grondona [2018] EWCA Civ 2031 
2 Stoffel & Co, n1, at [39] 
proceeds,3 a convicted murderer from claiming under her victim’s life insurance,4 and 
a motorcycle passenger who encouraged the inebriated rider to drive recklessly from 
recovering for resulting injuries.5  The denial of claims arising from the claimant’s 
wrongful action (‘ex turpi causa’) has particular significance where the benefit 
claimed is valuable, unique or irreplaceable, for example a proprietary right.   
Focussing on property disputes presents difficulties. Courts decide such disputes 
using broad principles where the feature shared by the dispute and the authorities 
referred to is not that the right claimed is proprietary, but that the claimant’s 
behaviour attracts the court’s disapproval.  This makes the body of case law 
unwieldy.  The Law Commission described it as ‘an intricate web of tangled rules 
that are difficult to ascertain and distinguish’,6 and as ‘[lacking] transparency’.7  
Judicial reasoning in this area frequently lacks ‘any discussion … of what 
considerations the court has taken into account in deciding whether the illegality 
defence applies’8.  The Law Commission admitted candidly that ‘in some areas the 
uncertainty and complexity is such that we have found it very time consuming and 
difficult to ascertain…what the present law is’.9   
                                                          
3 Everett v Williams (1725) reported at (1893) 9 LQR 197 
4 Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147 
5 Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24 
6 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence (Law Com No 320, 2010) para 3.5 
7 Law Commission, n6, para 1.5 
8 Law Commission, n6, para 3.5 
9 Law Commission, Illegal Transactions: the effect of Illegality on Contracts and Trusts  (Law Commission 
Consultation Paper No 154, 1999) paras 1.12-1.13 
Uncertainty of Definition 
No single definition of the ‘content’ of the principle exists.  The broad notion that 
courts will not assist in matters ‘tainted by illegality’10 (itself an attractive but 
ambiguous phrase) is sometimes described as ‘the illegality defence’ or simply 
‘illegality’11. The principle is often expressed as ‘ex turpi causa non oritur actio’ (‘from 
a base cause, no action will arise’).  
The difficulties in defining the content of the principle arise in part from uncertainty as 
to the type of conduct to which it applies. The Law Commission’s three possibilities 
were that it applied only to breaches of the criminal law, that it extended to civil 
breaches, and that it included ‘immoral behaviour’12.  It concluded, understandably, 
that deciding which was correct was ‘difficult’13. The uncertainty surrounding whether 
the principle applies equally to illegal and immoral conduct has particular relevance 
to property transactions. Property transfers which facilitate fraud or deprive creditors 
are likely to be illegal, and in the view of many, immoral.  But timely transfers to 
facilitate Tax planning are normally legal and is likely to be met with differing views 
as to their morality.   
The difficulty of defining the ‘content’ of the principle is compounded by uncertainty 
as to its ‘status’.  It is described variously as a ‘doctrine’,14  a ‘maxim’,15 a ‘rule of 
                                                          
10 Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 at [9] 
11 Law Commission, n4 and n7  
12 Law Commission, The Illegality Defence in Tort, (Law Com Consultation Paper No 160, 2001) para 1.12 
13 Law Commission, n12, para 1.13 
14 Law Commission, n12, para 5.22 
15 J Mance, ‘Ex Turpi Causa – When Latin Avoids Liability’ 18 Edinburgh L.Rev.175 (2014), 175 
public policy’,16 an ‘instrument of public policy’,17 a ‘brocard’,18 (‘An elementary 
principle or maxim’,19) and, as seen above, a ‘defence’.  Its nature and function in the 
context of judicial decision making are unclear.   This article uses the term ‘principle’, 
although even this term may impart an undeserved impression of substance and 
clarity. 
The principle is evidently longstanding.  In Patel v Mirza,20 the claimant sought the 
return of money transferred to facilitate the unlawful use of insider information.  By a 
majority, the Supreme Court upheld the claim.  Opening his judgment, Lord Toulson 
cited Lord Mansfield’s statement in Holman v Johnson that “No court will lend its aid 
to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act”.21 
These prominent dicta, suggesting clear and undisputed principle, reveal an 
immediate ambiguity; Does the court’s refusal to act apply where the claimant’s 
conduct is both immoral and illegal, or can it apply (as a disjunctive interpretation of 
‘or’ suggests) where the conduct is one but not both? 
Developing his reasoning, Lord Toulson quoted Lord Mansfield more fully, to the 
effect that: 
If…the cause of action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or the transgression of a 
positive law of this country, there the court says he has no right to be assisted 
… not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not …aid …such a 
plaintiff.  So if …the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the 
                                                          
16 J Mance, n15, 175 
17 Bakewell Management Limited v Brandwood [2004] UKHL 14 at [60] 
18 J Mance, n15, 176 
19 W Little and others,  The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1, (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1969) 224 
20 Patel, n10 
21 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341, 343 
latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally at fault, 
potior est conditio defendentis.22 
 
This provides little clarity.  Without explanation, Lord Mansfield apparently treated ‘ex 
turpi causa’ and ‘the transgression of a positive law’ as synonymous.  ‘turpis’ literally 
means ‘ugly, foul, [or] unsightly’.23 Its transferred meanings of ‘morally disgraceful, 
shameful [or] base’,24 have no immediate connection with ‘positive law’.   
Immediately before the above dicta, Lord Mansfield stated: 
The objection, that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and 
the defendant, sounds…very ill in the mouth of the defendant.  It is not for his 
sake, however, that the objection is … allowed; but is founded on general 
principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to real 
justice, as between [the parties], by accident...25 
 
Here, he distinguishes immoral and illegal contracts more explicitly, but omits 
reference to non-contractual conduct.  In explaining the ‘general principles of policy’ 
he identified only one principle, which he set out as ‘ex dolo malo non oritur actio’, 
and which, translated, formed the opening statement of Lord Toulson’s judgement in 
Patel.  ‘ex dolo malo’ translates as ‘from fraud’,26 which is more specific than ‘ex turpi 
causa’ (‘from a base cause’).  Perhaps most surprising is the admission that 
application of ex turpi causa, being accidental rather than designed is, or at least can 
be, ‘contrary to real justice’. 
                                                          
22 Patel, n10, para [1] 
23 D P Simpson, Cassell’s Latin-English English-Latin Dictionary (5th edn, Cassell 1987) 619 
24 Simpson, n23, 619 
25 Holman, n21, 343 
26 Simpson, n23, 201 
These observations are not merely exercises in legalistic or linguistic pedantry.  A 
disconcerting ‘looseness’ in articulating the principle obscures its nature and effect.  
Were Lord Mansfield’s pronouncements merely of historical interest, this might be 
less problematic, but as Lord Goff noted, the principle in Holman, misleadingly 
described as ‘basic’,27 and ‘clear and well recognised’28 has been applied ‘again and 
again, for over 200 years’.29  As Balcombe LJ noted in Pitts v. Hunt, ‘the ritual 
incantation of the maxim’ is ‘more likely to confuse than illuminate’.30 
Such incantation negates appropriate consideration of historical context. The court in 
Patel remarked that the doctrine in Holman was ‘formulated in a society that was 
vastly different from that which exists today…[and] which was much less 
regulated’.31 The relevance to contemporary property disputes of a judicial 
pronouncement made two centuries ago and more cautiously than is sometimes 
acknowledged can reasonably be questioned. 
Investigating the principle’s Roman Law origins adds little clarity.  Describing the 
related principle that ‘where both parties are equally at fault, the defendant’s position 
is stronger’, Grodecki identifies ‘uncertainty as to the principles which … guide the 
courts’.32 Early Roman Law contracts remained binding even if their purpose was 
‘illegal or immoral’.33 An exception developed for arrangements which courts would 
                                                          
27 Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340, 354 per Goff LJ 
28 Scott v Brown, Doering, McNab & Co [1892] 2 QB 724, 728 per Lindley LJ 
29 Tinsley, n27, 355 
30 Pitts v Hunt [1991] 1 QB 24, 49 
31 Patel, n10, para [52], Lord Toulson quoting from Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 609 
32 J K Grodecki, ‘In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis’, 71 LQR (1955) 254 
33 Grodecki, n32, 254 
not enforce because of ‘turpitudo’ by one or both contracting parties. In defining 
‘turpitudo’, Grodecki supports what he calls a ‘narrow’ interpretation, applicable only 
to conduct which was ‘immoral, and not merely illegal’,34 i.e. both immoral and illegal, 
thereby implying that conduct could be illegal without being immoral, but not 
seemingly the other way round. 
A conclusion that ex turpi causa comprises ‘an unhappy mix of rigid rules and value 
judgements’ 35  is reinforced by a tendency to treat it and in pari delicto as two 
aspects of a broader ‘illegality’ principle36 .This disregards their literal meanings and 
inherent differences.  in pari delicto envisages two opposing parties, who are equally 
at fault.  ex turpi causa does not.  A dispute might involve both principles, but many 
property disputes involve either multiple parties whose levels of fault differ or a single 
party who is at fault.  
Uncertainty of Application 
If the apparent simplicity and practical appeal of ex turpi causa conceals 
longstanding uncertainty as to its nature and function, applying it has, unsurprisingly, 
created ‘unpredictable and haphazard consequences’.37  The Law Commssion found 
that courts frequently cited Lord Mansfield’s comments in Holman, but left 
                                                          
34 Grodecki, n32, 255 
35 Mance, n15, 176 
36 For example, L Caylor and M Kenney, ‘In Pari Delicto and Ex Turpi Causa:  The Defence of Illegality- 
Approaches Taken in England and Wales, Canada and the US’, Business Law International Vol 18, No 3, 
September 2017, 259 
37 Mance, n15, 176 
unaddressed the rationale for applying them, the reasoning varying ‘even between 
members of the same court’.38 
Caselaw reveals an uncomfortable mix of approaches to applying the principle.  One 
approach considers whether granting relief would offend ‘the public conscience.’39  In 
Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst, Kerr LJ stated: 
The ex turpi causa defence … rests on a principle of public policy that the 
courts will not assist a plaintiff who has been guilty of illegal (or immoral) 
conduct of which the courts should take notice.  It applies if in all the 
circumstances it would be an affront to the public conscience to grant the 
plaintiff … relief’.40 
 
Significant here is the reference to ‘all the circumstances’ (which Lindley LJ 
confirmed in Scott v Brown, Doering, McNab & Co 41 exceed those pleaded), and the 
breadth and possible subjectivity of ‘an affront to the public conscience’ . Requiring 
courts to identify ‘all the circumstances’ and to decide whether affording relief would 
offend ‘the public conscience’ appears overwhelming, but the resemblance of ‘an 
affront to the public conscience’ to the literal meaning of ‘turpis’ cannot be 
overlooked.  Nor, it is suggested, does or should deciding what offends the public 
conscience necessarily imply excessive discretion or subjectivity. An analogy may be 
drawn with ‘unconscionability’, which initially appears disconcertingly broad and 
subjective, but which is ‘vital’ to deciding proprietory estoppel disputes,42 establishing 
constructive trusts and the equitable perfection of imperfect gifts.  Lord Walker’s 
                                                          
38 Law Commission, n12, para 5.22 
39 Euro-Diam Ltd v Bathurst [1990] 1 QB 1, 35 
40 Euro-Diam Ltd, n39, 35 
41 Scott, n28, 728 
 
42 M Pawlowski and J Brown, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Competing Equities’ (2018) 82 Conv. Issue 2 145, 155 
definition of unconscionability as ‘an objective [emphasis added] value judgment on 
behaviour’,43 provides reassurance that individual notions of what is unconscionable, 
or what, in the context of ex turpi causa, offends the public conscience, can 
effectively be displaced. 
Nevertheless the ‘public conscience’ test has been displaced by the ‘reliance’ test.  
In Tinsley,44 a couple put their property in the sole name of one of them, on the 
understanding that they were joint equitable owners, thereby enabling the other to 
make fraudulent benefit claims.  The legal owner subsequently claimed sole 
beneficial ownership.  By a majority the House of Lords upheld the trust, finding that 
reliance by the defendant on her illegal conduct was unnecessary to her claim, which 
rested upon common intention and contribution to the purchase price.  
The decision to abandon the ‘public conscience’ test appears to have been 
unanimous.  Lord Goff, giving the leading dissenting judgment stated that:  
the adoption of a public conscience test…would constitute a revolution in this 
branch of the law, under which … a discretion would become vested in the 
court to deal with the matter by…a balancing operation, in place of a system 
of rules, ultimately derived from the principle of public policy enunciated by 
Lord Mansfield C.J. in Holman v. Johnson which lies at the root of the law 
relating to claims which are … tainted by illegality.45 
 
Two points may be made.  Firstly, can ‘an unhappy mix of rigid rules and value 
judgments’46 really constitute ‘a system’, with its associated ideas of order and 
transparency?  Secondly, as Mance suggests, the retention of a public conscience 
                                                          
43 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55 at [28] 
44 Tinsley, n27 
45 Tinsley, n27, 363 
46 Mance, n15, 176 
test would ‘not perhaps have [been] so outlandish’.47  As will be seen, judicial and 
statutory authority (notably in New Zealand) for a ‘balancing operation’, of the type of 
which Lord Goff disapproved, is already evident. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson similarly held that ‘the consequences of being a party to an 
illegal transaction cannot depend… on such an imponderable factor as the extent to 
which the public conscience would be affronted …’48  This emphasis on the 
‘consequences’ of a finding of illegality, which can be arbitrary and ‘blunt’, is 
significant.  The problem is perhaps less the imponderable nature of an ‘affront to the 
public conscience’ in itself, but more the ‘binary’ nature of the result which a finding 
of such an affront has. 
A comparison of Tinsley with Collier v Collier 49 reveals the ‘random application’ of 
the principle.50 Mr Collier had transferred premises to his daughter, intending to 
defraud creditors and the Inland Revenue. She sought to terminate the licence under 
which he continued to occupy them.  The Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Collier 
and his daughter had agreed that she would hold the premises on trust for him.  
Nevertheless, it held he could only establish the trust by reference to its illegal terms.  
His claim for return of the premises failed and his daughter ‘gained a million-pound 
windfall’.51 
                                                          
47 Mance, n15,179 
48Tinsley, n27, 369 
49 Collier v Collier [2003] 1 P & C R  DG3 
50 Mance, n15, 182 
51 Mance, n15, 182 
In both Tinsley and Collier the parties knowlingly transfered land for a fraudulent 
purpose. Mance identifies ‘[no] real difference in opprobrium…between…Miss 
Milligan and [Mr Collier]’.52 Yet she succeeded and he failed.  By happy accident and 
selective reference to the facts, she could, unlike Mr Collier, argue the existence of a 
beneficial interest without referring to her fraudulent behaviour.  Investigation into her 
broader conduct exposed her dishonesty.  But this distinction seems contrived and 
requires division of a party’s conduct into those parts which are illegal and those 
which are not, thereby disregarding the ‘pattern’ of dishonesty evident in both cases. 
Lord Mansfield in Holman appears to have envisaged that the overriding 
consideration was the existence of illegality in an overarching sense (and however 
that is framed, both Miss Milligan’s and Mr Collier’s conduct fell within it), not the 
narrower technical point of whether that illegality needed to be pleaded.   
Nor, it is suggested, does ‘reliance’ accurately reflect the role which illegality played 
in the parties’ arguments.  Almost certainly, they would have preferred to conceal 
their dishonesty; Miss Milligan repaid the benefits in full, and Mr Collier argued that 
his fraudulent intention was never fulfilled. To that extent the dishonesty simply 
‘emerged’, rather than being ‘relied upon’ in the sense of being brought with 
confidence and assurance to the forefront of an argument.  
Patel v Mirza represents another approach as to how ex turpi causa should be 
applied, emphasizing the importance of principle and proportionality.  Lord Toulson 
described its rationale as: 
                                                          
52 Mance, n15, 182 
it would be contrary to the public interest to enforce a claim if to do so would 
[harm]…the integrity of the legal system (or possibly, certain aspects of public 
morality, the boundaries of which have never been made entirely clear).53 
 
He stated that identifying possible harm to the public interest required consideration 
of, firstly, ‘the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed’, 
secondly, ‘any other relevant public policy on which denial of the claim may have an 
impact’ and thirdly, whether ‘denial of the claim would be a proportionate response to 
the illegality’.54 Lim calls maintaining the integrity of the legal system and the 
subsequent considerations, ‘propositions 1, 2a, 2b and 2c’.55  Lord Toulson 
concluded by stating that ‘the public interest is best served by a principled and 
transparent assessment of the considerations identified’,56 rather than by a formal 
approach resulting in ‘arbitrary, unjust, or disproportionate’ results.57 
A desire that judicial decision making be ‘principled’ assumes that clear principles 
exist. In this context, it is contended that they do not. Furthermore, Lord Toulson’s 
proposal appears to be a ‘balancing operation’ in relation to competing public policy 
considerations of the type to which Lord Goff in Tinsley objected, but leaves 
unaddressed the priority or relative weights of propositions 1, 2a, 2b and 2c.  Lim’s 
view that Lord Toulson’s approach ‘has merely replaced the existing uncertainties 
with another or different level of uncertainty’ would appear the most likely outcome.58 
                                                          
53 Patel, n10, at [120] 
54 Patel, n10, at [120] 
55 E Lim, ‘Ex Turpi Causa: Reformation not Revolution’, (2017) 80(5) MLR 927, 930 
56 Patel, n10, at [120] 
 
57 Patel, n10, at [120] 
 
58 Lim, n55, 936 
 
There is also an inherent difficulty in defining ‘proportionality’. Lord Mansfield did not 
refer to it in Holman.  His acknowledgment that the principle operates ‘contrary to 
real justice’ indicates that any suggestion that the principle should provide a 
proportionate response either to the harm suffered, or to the claimant’s fault is 
misplaced. The factors identified by Lord Toulson to determine the proportionality of 
refusing relief, including ‘the seriousness of the conduct, its centrality to the 
contract… and whether there was a marked disparity in the parties’ respective 
culpability’59 are merely illustrative and infinitely variable. 
Inflexibility of Outcome 
The effect of imperfect definition and inconsistent application of ex turpi causa is 
heightened by the starkness of the relief available. Where it applies, the effect is not 
judicial disapproval (although elements of this were evident in the rejected ‘public 
conscience’ test), but ‘judicial abstention’.60 In property disputes, the property ‘lie[s] 
where it falls’61, demonstrating a curious judicial indifference towards undeserved 
gain. This ‘bluntness’ sits uneasily with the allocation of proprietory interests 
elsewhere.  Proprietory estoppel allows varied remedies including the grant of a life 
interest or the transfer of a legal or equitable interest.  The Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 allows courts hearing disputes on the nature and 
                                                          
59 Patel, n10 at [107] 
 
60 Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex [2014] 3 WLR 1257 at [23] 
 
61 Singh v Ali [1960] AC 167 at 176-177 
 
extent of a proprietory interest to make such orders as they ‘think fit’,62 having regard 
to the circumstances of the trust.63 
 
Conflict of ex turpi causa with prescription and adverse possession 
Equally problematic is the uncertain application of ex turpi causa to prescription and 
adverse possession.  Prescriptive claims rest on a ‘tortious invasion of the servient 
owner’s land’,64 which is ‘cured by the effluxion of the prescriptive period’.65 This 
uncertain application becomes particularly noticable where the conduct is criminal. In 
Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood,66 Brandwood claimed prescriptive 
vehicular rights across a common.  Bakewell opposed the claim, relying on the 
prohibition under section 193(4) Law of Property Act 1925 of driving across common 
land ‘without lawful authority’. 
The House of Lords held that public policy did not prevent the acquisition of a 
prescriptive right where lawful authority could have removed the criminality.  It held 
that the finding did not reintroduce the public conscience test rejected in Tinsley, but 
that ‘the maxim ex turpi causa must be applied as an instrument of public policy, and 
not in any circumstances where it does not serve any public interest’.67   
                                                          
62 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (‘TOLATA 1996’) s 14(2)(b) 
63 TOLATA 1996 s 15(1) 
64 K Gray and S F Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2009), 669 
65 K Gray and S F Gray, n64, 669 
66 Bakewell, n17 
67 Bakewell, n17 at [60] per Lord Walker 
The facts of Bakewell render this assertion unsatisfactory. Section 193 evidently 
serves a public purpose. Sections 193(1) and (4) allow the public ‘rights of access for 
air and exercise’ and prohibit camping and lighting fires on common land, the evident 
intention being to maintain public appeal.  If the section serves a public purpose, it is 
unclear why preventing someone acquiring a valuable proprietory interest from 
breaching it is not also in the public interest.  The reasoning appears to be that the 
public benefit served by enforcing the statute is not non-existent, but was 
outweighed by the public benefit served by breach of it, essentially a ‘balancing’ of 
competing public priorities.  Rather than stating this, the court envisaged a scenario 
in which the servient owner could have granted permission.  Where the absence of 
lawful authority is not in doubt, it is not immediately obvious why the court should be 
concerned with a hypothetical outcome had something, which was evidently not the 
case, been the case. 
It is suggested that the decision was in large part driven by a concern for 
proportionality, as envisaged later by Lord Toulson in Patel.  Vehicles had used one 
track across a large common for decades, apparently harmlessly.  Consequently it 
was disproportionate then to prohibit that conduct in order to preserve a minimal 
public benefit. The broader conclusion appears to be, however, that deciding the 
proper meaning and effect of the illegality was avoided rather than addressed. 
Equally problematic is the proper application of ex turpi causa to adverse possession 
cases where the squatter’s conduct is criminal.  In R (on the application of Best) v 
The Chief Land Registrar,68 the Land Registrar rejected Mr Best’s application, as his 
conduct breached section 144 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
                                                          
68 R (on the application of Best) v The Chief Land Registrar [2015] EWCA Civ 17 
Act 2012.  Finding otherwise, Sales, McCombe and Arden LLJ addressed the 
significance of his criminal conduct very differently. 
McCombe LJ held that the decision was ‘powerfully supported’ by the House of 
Lords decision in Bakewell,69 and appeared firmly to support the means by which 
illegality of the conduct in Bakewell was neatly, if not altogether convincingly, 
addressed. 
Arden LJ on the other hand reached her conclusion ‘purely through conventional 
statutory interpretation’.70 She expressly stated that she did not rely on Bakewell,71 
and concluded that Parliament’s intention was that adverse possession should not 
be barred by acts which contravened section 144.72  In her view, the facts and proper 
statutory construction were ‘sufficient to exclude ex turpi causa in this instance’.73 
The apparent ease with which both judges concluded that ex turpi causa did not 
apply contrast with the efforts which Sales LJ made to explain how it did apply, but 
could be adapted.  He appeared to treat it as merely one of several competing 
considerations, and to impart it with a significant capacity for modification.  He stated 
that ‘the public interest in having land put to good use and in having clear rules to 
govern acquisition of title to [abandoned] land … override[s] the general concern that 
a person should not benefit from their own unlawful actions’.74 
                                                          
69 Best, n68, at [99]–[100] 
70 Best, n68, at [101] 
71 Best, n68, at [109] 
72 Best, n68, at [133] 
73 Best, n68, at [133] 
74 Best, n68, at [44] 
Quoting directly from Lord Wilson’s judgment in Hounga v. Allen,75 (which permitted 
an employee illegally in the UK to claim unlawful race discrimination), Sales LJ 
identified the inherent flexibility of rules based on public policy.  He quoted from 
Bowen LJ in Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co v Nordenfelt,76 that such 
rules ‘not being rules which [are] fixed or customary law, are capable, on proper 
occasion, of expansion or modification’.77 
He then undertook ‘a balancing of public policy factors’,78 asking firstly ‘What … 
aspect of public policy… founds the defence’, and secondly ‘is there another aspect 
of public policy to which application of the defence would run counter?’.79  He 
appeared (adopting the Bakewell reasoning) to conclude from the fact that because 
a houseowner can, by consent, remove the criminality of the squatter’s conduct, 
there was no ‘overriding public policy concern associated with s.144 …to affect the 
usual balance of interests…established by … adverse possession’.80 
What emerges is considerable doubt surrounding the role, if any, which ex turpi 
causa plays, whether it can be displaced entirely by statutory interpretation, and 
whether it is capable of expansion and modification.  For judicial consensus on the 
outcome for the claimant to co-exist with such profound disagreement as to how that 
consensus is reached is neither conceptually nor practically satisfactory. 
                                                          
75 Hounga v. Allen [2014] UKSC 47 
76 Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch 630, 661 
77 Best, n68, at [53] 
78 Best, n68, at [86] 
 
79 Best, n68, at [53] 
 
80 Best, n68, at [88] 
 
Clarification 
A step towards clarity might be formally to determine the applicability of the principle 
to immoral conduct. Responding to a Law Commission draft Bill, confined to trusts 
made to conceal criminal activity, Davies argues that extension to immoral conduct 
would create ‘unnecessary uncertainty’.81  Significant here is the distinction between 
‘uncertainty’ and ‘unnecessary uncertainty’: It might be argued that some uncertainty 
is a necessary feature of a principle which attempts to address a complex range of 
facts and behaviours. 
Defining immoral conduct presents considerable difficulties:  HM Revenue and 
Customs describe lawful tax avoidance as ‘bending the rules of the tax system to 
gain a tax advantage’.82 Describing the same behaviour, the Adam Smith Institute 
states simply ‘There’s only obeying the law and not obeying it’.83 Nevertheless it is 
suggested that to exclude from application of the principle conduct which is merely 
immoral may be too restrictive.  Statutory provisions elsewhere openly prohibit 
immoral conduct, at least in a contractual context: In Israel, section 30 Contracts 
(General Part) Law 5733-1973 states unambiguously that, ‘A contract, the 
conclusion, contents or object of which are illegal, immoral or contrary to public 
policy is void’.  In England and Wales, judicial indications that the principle does, or 
at least can, extend to immoral conduct are prominent84   
                                                          
81 P Davies, ‘Turning the Clock Back’ [2010] 74 Conv, Issue 4 282, 283 
82 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/tax-avoidance-an-introduction (last accessed 14 September 2018) 
83 https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/tax-spending/there-is-no-such-thing-as-tax-avoidance (last accessed 14 
September 2018) 
84 Patel, n10 per Lord Toulson, Euro-Diam, n39 per Kerr LJ, Holman, n25 per Mansfield LJ  
 
To dismiss the applicability of the principle to immoral conduct also disregards the 
realities of statutory and judicial law making.  Morality, and legislative and judicial 
responses to it, are fluid:  Efforts to curtail tax avoidance attempt to convert immoral 
conduct to unlawful conduct.  Newly devised tax avoidance schemes lie between 
possible immorality and illegality until tested.  Refusal to apply the principle to 
immoral conduct also disregards anomalies in the current law, for example the 
limitation of the criminal offence of squatting to residential property; morally, the 
distinction between occupying derelict houses and occupying derelict factories might 
be questionable, but legally the distinction is vital.   
A more pressing requirement is perhaps clarifying operation of the principle more 
broadly.  Possible reforms to its substance and application depend on reformers’ 
appetite for contention.  Lim suggests amending Lord Toulson’s articulation in Patel, 
subordinating the ‘proportionality’ consideration (proposition 2c) to those which 
precede it.85 Cases capable of resolution using propositions 1, 2a and 2b would not 
require consideration of proposition 2c. Subordinating proportionality would, Lim 
argues, address the vulnerability of that consideration to the criticism that Lord Goff 
made in Tinsley of the reliance test, that it would require the court to undertake a 
balancing exercise on a case by case basis.86  
Such clarification of existing judicial dicta is attractive, but leaves unaddressed how 
propositions 1, 2a and 2b would relate to each other.  Moreover, Lord Toulson’s 
dicta, being both illustrative and deliberately broad might not support so subtle a 
clarification. To subordinate proportionality in this way also appears to conflict with its 
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prominence in Stoffel, where the argument that it would be ‘entirely 
disproportionate’87 to deny the claimant’s claim appears to have prevailed. 
The principle’s intimidating breadth might be addressed by allowing it to develop 
separate lines of authority, so that illegality in the acquisition of property rights differs 
from illegality in property law more broadly and from illegality in contract, tort or 
employment law.  This ‘splitting’ the principle would reduce the range of factually 
dissimilar authorities with which practitioners and courts must currently engage.   
There is evidence that such a distinction already exists. Paraphrasing Lord Hoffman 
in Gray v. Thames Trains Ltd,88 Lord Toulson in Patel observed that:  
ex turpi causa expresses not so much a principle, but a policy based on a 
group of reasons, which vary in different situations.  The courts…therefore 
evolved varying rules to deal with different situations.  Because questions 
of fairness and policy were different in different cases and led to different 
rules, one could not simply extrapolate rules applicable to one situation 
and apply them to another.89 
 
This warning against treating cases as transposable authorities calls into question 
the tendency of courts to draw upon factually diverse cases.  Division of the principle 
into discrete areas might be effected by statutory provision that in disputes involving, 
for example, real property, contract or tort, courts should only consider decisions 
concerning illegality in areas outside those as they think is justified on the facts.  
Attempts at reform in England and Wales favour an incremental approach.  The Law 
Commission’s 2010 draft Bill’90 concerns only the use of trusts to conceal criminal 
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activity, leaving ex turpi causa to develop differently elsewhere.  It applies to trust 
disputes concerning ‘any property’,91 where a party claiming an equitable interest 
would succeed if reliance on an unlawful act were permitted,92 and where 
‘concealment conditions’ are met.93  These relate to concealing equitable interests ‘in 
connection with the commission of an offence’.94  The ‘starting point’ under the draft 
Bill is that courts should disregard such illegality, thereby entitling the claimant to the 
relevant equitable interest.   
 
Only in ‘exceptional’ (which is undefined) circumstances can courts deny claimants 
the equitable interest, which must then pass to the trustee, the settlor or another 
beneficiary (but not more than one of these)95.  In identifying exceptional 
circumstances, the court may consider ‘anything which it thinks relevant’ including 
‘the conduct of all relevant persons’,96  ‘the value of the relevant equitable interest’,97 
and ‘any deterrent effect on others’.98  
  
The presumption that a wrongdoing party will be able to enforce rights differs from 
the New Zealand and Israel presumption that a wrongdoing party will be denied 
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normal remedies.99  The draft Bill only covers trust arrangements connected with 
criminality. It leaves ‘exceptional circumstances’ undefined for the purposes of 
rebutting the presumption, believing that definition could ‘safely be left to the 
courts’.100 This creates ‘an obscure burden of uncertain height’,101 above which the 
court’s wide discretion should apply, and an unexplained imbalance between the 
breadth of the factors which the court may consider, and the narrowness of the 
options available to it following that consideration.    
The draft Bill is intended, within its narrow scope, to ‘abolish’ the reliance principle,102 
but appears to avoid suggesting reinstating the public conscience test.  The 
distinction between the discretion afforded by the draft Bill, and the public 
conscience test appears ‘very fine’,103 or, it is argued, imperceptible, but whether this 
is deliberate is unclear. 
Nevertheless, the draft Bill’s brevity and order contrast favourably with current 
complexity and ambiguity.  Its narrow application also supports the suggestion that 
illegality can operate differently in different areas.  Removing one area of law from an 
unwieldy and unpredictable principle improves upon inaction. 
The draft Bill also explicitly allows illegality to be disregarded. Such disregard is 
implied in Best, but express provision is welcome.  Finally the discretion afforded on 
what factors the court might consider (and depending on how ‘exceptional’ were 
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construed, the circumstances in which that discretion arises) is broad, and evidently 
deliberately so.  
An amended draft Bill might remove the reference to ‘exceptional circumstances’ to 
allow courts broad discretion to consider or disregard unlawful conduct.  Davies 
argues that such discretion would be ‘vague’.104  But perhaps this approach differs 
from that currently applied only in the extent to which judges expressly articulate the 
role which their own discretion, rather than precedent, plays.  An amended draft Bill 
might also permit the broad discretion available in ‘exceptional circumstances’ also 
to govern where the equitable interest should fall.  If the inflexibility of the outcome 
following a finding of ex turpi causa might lie behind the inconsistency of courts when 
applying it, this would best be addressed by removing that inflexibility. 
The limited remedies under the draft Bill contrast with those available in New 
Zealand.  The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 defines an ‘illegal contract’ as 
one which ‘is illegal at law or in equity, whether [in] …creation or… performance’.105  
It presumes such contracts are ineffective, but allows courts wide discretion to 
displace the presumption and to grant such relief as it ‘thinks just’106, including 
restitution, compensation, variation or total or partial validation of the contract and 
the vesting or delivery up of all or part of any property.107  
Conclusion 
The intimidating breadth and enduring complexity of ex turpi causa present clear 
practical disincentives to reform. Reformers may justifiably feel that their efforts will 
                                                          
104 Davies, n85,289 
105 Section 71(1)(a) The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 
106 Sections 75 and 76 The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 
107 Section 76(4) The Contract and Commercial Law Act 2017 
go unrewarded, and that identifying how the principle operates now, leaving aside 
how that operation might be improved, is in some sense ‘too difficult’.  Nevertheless, 
the inescapable appeal of preventing wrongdoers benefitting from their wrongdoing 
means courts will continue to be encouraged to withhold remedies in such 
circumstances. Similarly, defendants will continue to utilise the current complexity by 
pointing to unlawful aspects of the claimant’s behaviour. Doubt surrounding the 
principle’s status and function will continue.  
If maintaining the integrity of the legal system is, as Lord Toulson in Patel stated, the 
primary pupose of ex turpi causa, it is suggested that that maintenance requires 
renewed enthusiasm for reform, departure from familiar precedents which deny 
courts clear guidance, a more explicit intention of developing ex turpi causa 
incrementally in different areas, and exclusion from its application of prescription and 
adverse possession. It is also suggested that the integrity (although almost certainly 
not, it is conceded, the clarity) of the legal system would not be harmed by applying 
the principle to immoral conduct.  The discretion afforded in New Zealand, perhaps 
coupled with a formal extension to such conduct, as alluded to in Holman, Euro-
Diam and Patel, might be a realistic starting point. 
